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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEC's NEW RULE
CHANGE TO REGULATE HEDGE FUNDS
Alex R. McClean t
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 26, 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission's
("SEC") Board of Commissioners voted 3-2 to enact a proposed rule to
regulate hedge funds.' The SEC proposed the rule on July 28, 2004, after
two years of research and evaluation of the industry.2 The SEC claims that
the rule it chose was "the mildest one possible. 3 However, this "mild" rule
has been a cause of controversy both within the United States and abroad.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary John W.
Snow, President George W. Bush, and the Republicans in both the House
and the Senate opposed the new rule.4 Two of the three Republican Com-
missioners at the SEC opposed the rule as well. 5 Regulators in the European
Union sent comment letters to the Commission expressing concerns about
the extraterritorial effects of the new rule.6 The SEC received twice as many
t B.S., Brigham Young University (2003); M.B.A., Case Western Reserve University
Weatherhead School of Management (2006); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School
of Law (2006). Recipient of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Distin-
guished Note Award (2005). I would like to thank Andrew Malone for his thoughtful feed-
back, proofreading, and patience. I would also like to thank Dean Hiram Chodosh and the
Journal of International Law for their assistance in developing this note. Finally, I would like
to thank my dear wife Joy, whose unconditional support made this note possible.
1 Carrie Johnson, SEC May Lift Information Restrictions: Changes Proposed to 'Quiet
Period' Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2004, at El.
2 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rule/final/ia-2333.pdf.
3 Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: SEC Screwdriver Joins Spitzer Hammer as Hedge-
Trimmer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2004, at C1.
4 Stephen Labaton, Hedge Fund Plan Fractures Civility of Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 2004, at C1.
5 Id.
6 See Letter from David Wright, Dir., European Comm'n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 1 (Sept. 15, 2004) (SEC file number S7-30-04), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml.
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comment letters from those opposed to the new rule than they received from
those in favor of the new rule.7
Many Americans reading the headlines were likely left wondering,
"What are hedge funds?" and, "Why is everyone so concerned about them?"
Hedge funds are legal entities that allow investors to pool their money to-
gether, which is then managed by an investment manager who exploits pric-
ing inefficiencies in the market to generate high returns while trying to as-
sume as little risk as possible. Hedge funds are available only to the wealthy
because of the high minimum investment required, 8 which explains why
many Americans are not familiar with them.
Hedge funds grew quietly in America for their first thirty five years
of existence. Until recently regulators at the SEC, as well as the public, paid
little attention to hedge funds. By the early 1990's, hedge funds had grown
rapidly, increasing in size to 300 known funds. 9 By the turn of the century,
that number had grown to nearly 6,000.10 In addition to the rapid growth,
one particular hedge fund led to increased public and regulatory scrutiny. In
1998, a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management was at the verge
of insolvency. Long-Term Capital Management was a highly leveraged
hedge fund with an international portfolio that had a market capitalization of
over $3 billion." The impending collapse of the fund threatened the stability
of international capital markets.' 2 In order to avoid this collapse, the presi-
dent of The New York Federal Reserve Bank, William McDonough, organ-
ized a $3.5 billion bailout of Long-Term Capital Management. 13 The near
collapse of Long-Term Capital Management raised public and regulatory
awareness of hedge funds. Following the near collapse of Long-Term Capi-
tal Management, the SEC began to research and analyze the hedge fund
industry, resulting in the SEC's new rule to regulate hedge funds. The new
7 Recent Developments in the Hedge Fund Industry, HEDGE FUND NEWSL. (Bryan Cave
L.L.P., St. Louis, Mo.), Sept. 30, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.bryancave.com/pubs/
search/asp.
8 The mean minimum investment required in the fourth quarter of 2000 was $630,729
while the median was $250,000. The large discrepancy between the mean and median indi-
cates that there is a high degree of variance in the minimum investment requirement among
hedge funds. SLMONE BORLA & DENIS MASETrI, HEDGE FUNDS: A RESOURCE FOR INVESTORS
13 (2003).
9 Erik J. Greupner, Note, Hedge Funds are Headed Down-market: A Call for Increased
Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1561 (2003).
10 Id.
11 See Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue: A Hedge Fund Falters, and
Wall Street Giants Ante Up $3.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998, at Al.
12 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172, 45,174 (proposed July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275,279).
13 See Raghavan & Pacelle, supra note 11.
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rule requires hedge funds to disclose information about their investment
positions and personal information about the manager running the fund. 4
In response to the new rule, hedge fund managers threatened that
they would move offshore to avoid registering with the SEC.' 5 A mass exo-
dus of hedge funds leaving the United States for offshore financial centers
would be detrimental to the U.S. financial market and keep the SEC from
accomplishing the purposes of the new rule. 16 It would also result in the loss
of talented U.S. fund managers 17 and limit the investment opportunities for
American investors.'8 Hedge funds are perfectly able to carry out these
threats because all of their assets (cash, investments, and human capital) are
very mobile.
On December 10, 2004, the SEC announced that it had approved
the proposed rule, making it law.' 9 Everyone braced for the worst, expecting
many U.S. hedge funds to move offshore when the law went into effect in
February of 2005.20
Hedge funds, however, are not moving anywhere. Hedge fund man-
agers will not act on their threat because market conditions, foreign regula-
tors, and provisions of the new rule make moving offshore impractical. The
rise in investor power in the hedge fund industry, accompanied by the si-
multaneous fall in hedge fund manager power, has given investors more
power to demand greater transparency from hedge fund managers. The re-
sult of the power change is that hedge fund managers cannot avoid disclo-
sure by moving offshore, because their investors will demand disclosure
wherever the hedge fund is domiciled. Additionally, many offshore jurisdic-
tions have adopted the SEC's new rule themselves, making it difficult for
hedge funds to avoid disclosure by moving offshore.
Section II discusses in detail the precursors that led to the new rule
to regulate hedge funds. This section begins by defining hedge funds and
explaining the typical investment strategies that hedge funds employ. A
14 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rule/final/ia-2333 .pdf.
15 Jeff Sommer, Bermuda Isn't Far, Hedge Funds Warn, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, § 3,
at 8.
16 See id
17 Richard A. Steinwurtzel et al., SEC Releases Final Rule Requiring Hedge Fund Man-
ager Registration, 24 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1 (2005).
18 Peter O'Leary & Brian McDermott, Hedge Funds in Ireland-A Review of Develop-
ments during 2004 and the Outlook for 2005, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS MGMT. ASS'N J.,
Dec. 2004.
19 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 72,054.
20 Sommer, supra note 15; Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054.
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description of hedge fund investors and a history of hedge funds are given.
Finally, Section II concludes by exploring the modem advancements in
hedge funds.
Section III analyzes the history of SEC oversight of the hedge fund
industry. Section III then explores the previous exceptions that allowed
hedge funds to be exempt from the Securities Act of 1933 and the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940. The section finishes by explaining how the new
rule closes the exemptions hedge funds had previously enjoyed under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Section IV thoroughly analyzes the new rule. The section begins
with a history of why the SEC decided to regulate the hedge fund industry.
The problems that the SEC staff sought to solve are identified followed by
an analysis of how the new rule helps to alleviate those problems. Next,
Section IV evaluates the changes the new rule makes extraterritorially fol-
lowed by a description of the regulatory climate in Europe and in the Carib-
bean. Section IV concludes by exploring the extraterritorial effects the new
rule has on investors and regulators abroad.
Section V concludes that the threat to move offshore are hollow and
outlines the reasons why. The section demonstrates why hedge funds will
not move offshore to avoid regulation under the new rule.
II. UNDERSTANDING HEDGE FUNDS
A. Definition of Hedge Funds
Hedging is defined as: "[t]aking a position in two or more securities
that are negatively correlated to reduce risk."'', This definition of hedge
funds would have been an accurate definition of hedge funds in the 1950's
and 1960,s,22 but today most hedge funds do not hedge in the traditional
sense.2 3 Most hedge funds today try to exploit temporary price discrepancies
in the price of an underlying asset in world financial markets.24
Hedge funds are investment vehicles that employ a variety of in-
vestment strategies that historically have avoided regulation. Attempting to
define such a loosely related group of unrelated investment vehicles is chal-
lenging. The chairperson of the SEC, William Donaldson, in recent testi-
mony before the House Financial Services Committee, said that he was not
sure that the SEC would "ever come up with a definition that is broad
21 STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CoRPoRATE FINANCE 262-264 (6th ed. 2002).
22 See Helen Parry, Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the High Net Worth Investor: A Case
for Greater Protection?, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 703 (2001); See also BORLA & MASETrI,
supra note 8, at 2.
23 See BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at xv.
24 Daniel Kadlec, Will Hedge Funds Take a Dive?, TIME, Oct. 4, 2004, at 65.
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enough or meaningful enough" to define hedge funds.25 Academic legal
writers attempt to define hedge funds as, "privately offered, relatively un-
regulated pooled investment vehicles in the form of limited partnerships or
limited liability companies that have the flexibility to invest in a broad
range of securities and commodities using a broad range of trading tech-
niques. ' '26 Other common features of hedge funds are high initial invest-
ments, a relatively small number of investors, and the ability to invest in a
wide range of financial instruments.
When a person invests in a hedge fund structured as a limited part-
nership, that person becomes a partner with the manager, usually a star
trader from Wall Street, causing the investor and the money manager to
become co-investors.27 Offshore funds are typically structured as limited
liability companies in which-the investor is a shareholder, with little or no
voting rights.28
The hedge fund industry is young, a recent study of over 2,000
hedge funds revealed that the average hedge fund is only four years old.29
Hedge funds typically attempt to exploit market inefficiencies through tem-
porary price discrepancies in commodity and securities markets.30 Hedge
funds exploit market inefficiencies by short selling stock; utilizing sophisti-
cated hedging strategies to reduce interest rate volatility and other risks
from market exposure; and using futures contracts or derivatives to leverage
their portfolio.31 Almost all hedge funds attempt to locate mispriced securi-
ties, in differing forms, within the world's financial market; then, using
debt, hedge funds expand, or leverage, their positions in the mispriced secu-
rities to reap maximum gains for investors while incurring as little risk as
possible. 32
25 The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing Market Risk:
Hearing Before the SubComm., on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises of the Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 12 (2003) (statement of Wil-
liam H. Donaldson, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission).
26 Greupner, supra note 9, at 1559.
27 ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS: THE EASY WAY TO GET STARTED 7-8
(2003).
28 See STEFANO LAVINIO, THE HEDGE FUND HANDBOOK: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE FOR
ANALYZING AND EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 157 (2000).
29 Roy Kouwenberg & William T. Ziemba, Incentives and Risk Taking in Hedge Funds,
Workshop at the University of Bergamo in Bergamo, Italy (May 17-21, 2004), available at
www.unibg.it/static-content/ricerca/dipartimento-matematica/eumoptfin3abstract/Ziemba2.
pdf.
30 Kadlec, supra note 24, at 66.
31 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172, 45,174 (proposed July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275,279).
32 See Kadlec, supra note 24, at 66.
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B. Hedge Fund Investment Strategies
Hedge funds employ three main categories of strategies to generate
their returns. These categories are relative value strategies, event driven
strategies, and opportunistic strategies. Relative value funds generate re-
turns by extracting profits from the price inefficiencies in specific financial
instruments. 33 These price inefficiencies occur when the price of the finan-
cial instruments differs from its historical value.34 There are three types of
relative value funds: convertible arbitrage funds, fixed income arbitrage
funds, and equity market neutral funds. Relative value hedge funds have
averaged an annual return of 9.44% with an average annual volatility of
4.07%35 compared with the S&P 500 that had an average return of 10.04%
with an average annual volatility of 17.6% during a similar time span.36 The
volatility indicates how much the average annual return of the fund fluctu-
ates within any given year within a 95% confidence interval.37 For instance,
an average volatility of 4.07% with a return of 9.44% indicates with 95%
confidence that in any given year the annual return for a relative value fund
will fall between 5.37% and 13.5 1%.
Event-driven funds take financial positions based on whether a
company will or will not go through a structural change. The types of struc-
tural changes are mergers, acquisitions, and restructurings. 38 While the oc-
currence of one of these events is uncertain, hedge fund managers will take
a long or short position on the stock based upon whether they think the
event will occur or not. The risk of each individual position is neutralized
by the firm's entire portfolio of positions.39 There are two types of event-
driven funds: merger, or risk arbitrage, funds and distressed securities
funds.40 These funds have an average annual return of 10.67% and an an-
nual average volatility of 6. 1%.41
The final and most controversial grouping of hedge funds is oppor-
tunistic funds. This type of fund encompasses a broad range of funds, all of
which attempt to manipulate financial markets. This type of strategy is also
more risky because it involves speculating rather than hedging.42 The funds
33 See BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 18.
34 Id. at 19.
35 FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HEDGE FUNDS: QUANTITATIVE INSIGHTS 260 figs. 10.12 &
10.13 (2004).
36 Id. at 251.
37 See generally Ross ET AL., supra note 21, at 242-76.
38 BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 23.
31 See id. at 24.
40 Id. at 18.
41 See LHABITANT, supra note 35, at 260 figs. 10.12 & 10.13.
42 See BORLA & MASElTI, supra note 8, at 27 tbl. 1.8.
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that make up this category are macro funds, short selling funds, emerging
market funds, long/short funds43 and recently something the market has
dubbed long-only funds.44 These funds, with the exception of long-only
funds, have an average annual return of 7.7% with an annual average vola-
tility of 16.12%. 45 With the addition of long-only funds, this category will
only become riskier. The average return and volatility do not provide the
most accurate assessment of this class because of the disparity between the
different categories. For instance, the macro fund earned an annual return of
14.5% while fluctuating an average of 13.02% per year, while short selling
funds had an average annual return of -1.51% while fluctuating an average
of 19.55% a year.46
The result of these exotic trading strategies is that hedge funds tend
to be market neutral. 47 Thus, the returns for hedge funds move independ-
ently of the stock market. This relationship is important because it allows
investors with portfolios to diversify away some of the risk of the invest-
ment while maintaining its return.48 Hedge funds as a whole typically offer
a higher return for risk than traditional asset classes do. However, leading
academic Burton G. Malkiel has recently questioned the efficacy of the re-
turns that hedge funds report.49 According to Malkiel, relaxed reporting
requirements have allowed hedge funds to overstate their actual returns and
diversification potential. 50 Malkiel concludes that hedge funds "are far risk-
ier and provide much lower returns" than the market currently supposes. 51
C. Hedge Fund Investors
Investors invest in hedge funds for a myriad of reasons. The most
common reasons that people invest in hedge funds is the superior risk/return
tradeoff and the low correlation between hedge funds and the equity mar-
kets. From January 1994, to June 2003, hedge funds amassed an average
annual return of 10.95% while the corresponding return for the S&P 500
41 Id. at 18 fig. 1.9.
44 See Gregory Zuckerman, Going Long: Hedge Funds Take the Edge Off, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 29, 2004, at C 1.
45 See LHABITANT, supra note 35, at 260 figs. 10.12 & 10.13.
46 id.
47 See Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundation For Global Market
Crises: Hedge Funds, 4 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 5, 15 (1999).
48 See Ross ET AL., supra note 21, at 262-64.
49 Steve Hays, Hedge Fund Success May Not Be All it Seems, REUTERS, Feb. 11, 2005.
50 Id.
51 John F. Wasik, Investing: More Risk, Less Return, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 13,
2004, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print-ipub.php?file-/articles/2004/1 1/13/minvestl
3_ed3_.php.
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was 10.04%.52 What sets hedge funds apart is that despite earning a superior
return to that of the S&P 500 they did so while assuming less risk. During
the time-period from January 1994 to June 2003, hedge funds displayed an
annualized volatility of 9% while the S&P 500 during the same time-period
incurred an annualized volatility of 17.6%. 53 In an efficient market, a fund
that earns an above average return should only be able to do so by assuming
an above average amount of risk.54 Earning an above average return while
assuming less risk means that the fund truly did "beat the market., 55 Hedge
funds are able to generate superior returns while assuming less than average
risk during a bear market, bull market, or sideways market.
56
Another reason that investors invest in hedge funds is the low corre-
lation coefficients between hedge funds and the S&P 500.57 A low correla-
tion coefficient means that the two underlying securities, in this case hedge
funds and the S&P 500, do not move in unison. This is important to inves-
tors because it allows them to earn positive returns regardless of how the
stock market is performing. Investors who are looking to diversify their
portfolios are looking for investment opportunities with low correlation
coefficients because low correlation coefficients allow investors to elimi-
nate the unsystematic risk in their portfolios. 58 There is modest variation of
correlation coefficients among the different investment strategies employed
by hedge funds. The short selling funds and fixed income arbitrage funds
typically have had the lowest correlation coefficients while event driven
funds and long/short funds typically have higher correlation coefficients.59
On average, hedge funds have a .18 correlation coefficient during bull mar-
kets and a .53 correlation coefficient during bear markets. 60 This means that
hedge funds tend to follow the stock market more when it is increasing but
hedge funds do not follow the stock market as strongly when the stock mar-
ket is decreasing. These low to medium correlation coefficients with the
S&P 500, coupled with consistent positive returns, make hedge funds attrac-
tive to investors.
Hedge fund investors are divided into two categories: individual in-
vestors and institutional investors. Individual investors are further divided
52 LHABITANT, supra note 35, at 251.
13 Id. at 251 fig.10.2.
54 See generally Ross ET AL., supra note 21.
55 id.
56 Lodovico Gandini, Benefits of Allocation of Traditional Portfolios to Hedge Funds,
Spring, 2004, available at http://www.aima.org/uploads/Gandini.pdf.
57 LHABITANT, supra note 35, at 253.
58 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 21, at 245-249, 262-264.
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into U.S. investors and foreign investors. Foreign investors are typically
interested in offshore funds so they can avoid U.S. taxes.6' U.S. investors'
assets are divided into taxable and tax exempt assets. U.S. investors looking
to invest taxable assets typically will look to invest in onshore hedge funds,
while investors with tax-exempt assets will typically look to offshore funds
for their tax advantages. Individual investors are comprised almost entirely
of high-net-worth individuals. 62 Institutional investors are also divided into
taxed and tax-exempt institutions. Taxable institutions like banks, insurance
companies, and other investment funds typically invest in onshore funds,
while tax-exempt institutions like pension funds, endowments, and charita-
ble foundations typically invest in offshore funds.63 U.S. hedge funds are
comprised of 45% individual investors, 20% tax-exempt institutional inves-
tors, and 30% taxable institutional investors while offshore hedge funds are
comprised of 35% individual investors, 30% tax-exempt institutional inves-
tors, and 30% taxable institutional investors.
64
D. History of Hedge Funds
The emergence of hedge funds as serious players in financial mar-
kets is a recent phenomenon. Alfred Jones created the first hedge fund in
1949.65 He employed a strategy consisting of using leverage and long and
short selling to produce positive returns in both up and down markets.66
More specifically, he took "long positions in undervalued stocks and short
positions in overvalued stocks with a modest element of leverage. 67 Be-
tween 1955-1965 Mr. Jones's fund had a higher rate of return, 670%, than
any other fund in the world.68
During the 1940's, 50's and 60's, hedge funds only used leverage
and short selling to hedge their stock portfolio's movement in the equity
markets.69 Through the 1970's and 80's hedge funds became more complex
and risky.70 Some hedge funds continued to take long positions in the mar-
ket but utilized less short positions. 71 The increased reliance on long posi-
tions caused hedge funds to be more risky, which was only exasperated by
61 JAEGER, supra note 27, at 36-37.
62 Id. at 34.
63 id.
64 LHABITANT, supra note 35, at 11.
65 Greupner, supra note 9, at 1560.
66 Id.
67 Parry, supra note 22, at 703.
68 BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 2.
69 Carol J. Loomis, Hard Times Come to the Hedge Funds, FORTUNE, Jan. 1970, at 100.
70 See JAEGER, supra note 27, at 29-32.
71 See generally Loomis, supra note 69.
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their increased use of leverage. 72 During this time-period, new types of
hedge funds were born that relied on different investment strategies.73 At the
same time, hedge funds became more popular because of the high returns
they were able to offer.
The 1990's saw an exponential rise in the number of hedge funds as
wealth grew and initial investment requirements fell. During this time pe-
riod, there was exponential growth in the types of strategies that hedge
funds employed.74 As competition grew within the industry, traditional
strategies no longer offered high returns; forcing hedge fund managers to
look to new strategies to generate returns.75 By the late 1990's, hedge funds
had become so popular that they were no longer virtually unknown invest-
ment funds.
E. Modern Advancements in Hedge Funds
This once unregulated pooled investment tool is now coming under
increased scrutiny and regulation. The increased scrutiny of hedge funds is
the result of the rapid growth of hedge funds over the last decade. Before
1990, there were approximately 300 known hedge funds; since 1990, that
number has grown to over 6,000.76 In 2004, the U.S. hedge fund industry
grew by 19% to $973 billion, up from $820 billion in 2003. 77 Hedge funds
are growing at a rate of 15-20% per year and currently have assets under
management of approximately $1 trillion in the U.S.78
Today, hedge funds play a key part in ensuring the efficiency of our
markets. The chairperson of the Managed Fund Association, Adam Cooper,
testifying before Congress said: "[h]edge funds act as 'risk absorbers' in
[our financial] markets by serving as ready counterparties to those wishing
to hedge [their] risk, even when [the] markets are volatile. In addition their
active trading and research contribute to greater pricing efficiencies in our
financial markets.",79 Hedge funds use arbitrage to exploit mispriced assets
in our global markets. Hedge funds do this by buying an asset in one market
then simultaneously selling an identical asset in another market at a higher
72 Id.
73 See JAEGER, supra note 27, at 29-32.
74 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172, 45,174 (proposed July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275,279).
75 Zuckerman, supra note 44.
76 Greupner, supra note 9, at 1561.
77 Ben Wright, US Hedge Funds to Top $1 Trillion, Bus. ONLINE, Jan. 30, 2005, at Al.
78 Kadlec, supra note 24, at 65.
79 Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Adam C. Cooper, Chairman,
Managed Fund Association).
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price.8° Once a hedge fund identifies a mispriced asset, it will take advan-
tage of the opportunity until the price corrects itself. Hedge funds take such
a large position in the asset that its own trading activity quickly corrects the
price. As more hedge funds correct prices in global markets, prices become
more accurate and the markets become more efficient.
III. HEDGE FUND REGULATION
A. History of SEC's Oversight of Hedge Funds
Traditionally, the U.S. has not regulated hedge funds. However,
"the Commission has long been concerned about hedge funds and their
managers, and the impact their investment activities can have on" the coun-
try's financial markets. 81 The SEC first began to look at the impact of hedge
82funds as early as 1969. In 1971 the SEC conducted an economic study in
which the Commission "described the activities of hedge funds, noted the
serious conflicts of interest that hedge fund advisers ha[d], and noted their
growth., 83 At that time the hedge fund industry was still small and seemed
to have a negligible effect on U.S. markets. For the next twenty years, the
SEC paid little interest to the hedge fund industry. All of this changed with
the Long-Term Capital Management debacle.
In the mid-1990's Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a
large, highly leveraged hedge fund that employed two Nobel Prize winning
economists and a host of Ph.Ds.84 The fund's investment strategy used
complex models to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities throughout the
world's financial markets. 85 In August 1998, Russia's unexpected financial
crisis caused the unraveling of this highly leveraged fund, which threatened
the stability of international bond markets. 86 To avoid the impending fallout
the president of The New York Federal Reserve Bank, William
McDonough, orchestrated a bailout among prominent banks to save
LTCM.87 Although LTCM was saved from insolvency, the hedge fund in-
80 See generally Ross ET AL., supra note 2 1.
81 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172, 45,174 (proposed July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275,279).
82 Id. at 45,174.
83 Id.
84 ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE ANF FALL OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT xix, 31 (2001).
85 Jonathan H. Gatsik, Note, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar's Poker, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 591, 599 (2001).
86 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 12 (Apr. 28, 1999), available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf.
87 Raghavan & Pacelle, supra note 11.
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dustry was thrust into the national spotlight. The media coverage forced the
U.S. Congress and those in the investment community to consider greater
regulation of the hedge fund industry.
In 1999, the SEC and the President's Working Group on Financial
Markets conducted a study of the hedge fund industry. 88 In 2002, the SEC
directed its staff to once again examine the activities of hedge funds and
determine the number and size of hedge funds; document cases of fraud
involving hedge funds; and document the activities of hedge funds that
might affect a broader group of people other than wealthy individuals and
families that had traditionally invested in hedge funds. 89 At the conclusion
of this study, the SEC staff published a report entitled Implications of the
Growth of Hedge Funds, where the Commission found that the growth of
hedge funds raised a number of public policy concerns, most notably the
issue of investor protection.9" This report was a precursor to the new rule to
regulate hedge funds.
B. Previous Regulation of Hedge Funds
Previously, most hedge funds were able to circumvent most regula-
tion through a series of exemptions and safe harbors built into the 1933 Se-
curities Act and the 1940 Investment Advisers Act.91 Hedge funds avoided
registration under the 1933 Act by relying on the Section 4(2) exemption
that applies to firms that sell securities through a nonpublic offering to so-
phisticated investors.92 Congress enacted the exemption to allow issuers to
avoid registration requirements when the public was not privy to the issue
and therefore would not benefit from the registration. 93 The sophisticated
investor standard was molded into the accredited investor concept in the
Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. 94 The Court indi-
cated that the exemption for nonpublic offerings would depend on whether
or not the offerees are considered accredited under the Act, meaning the
offerees have to be sophisticated enough to obtain and analyze the financial
88 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
45,174.
89 Id.
90 U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, at x (2003), reprinted in DANFORTH
TOWNLEY, UNDERSTANDING HEDGE FUNDS & PENDING REGULATION: WHAT You NEED TO
KNOW Now 147 (2004) [hereinafter SEC Staff Report].
91 Greupner, supra note 9, at 1583-84, 1586.
92 Id. at 1584; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1999) (defining "accredited ihvestors").
93 Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 681, 689
(2000).
94 See Sec. & Exch. Com'n v. Ralston Purina Co.. 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
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data from the offeror that would be disclosed in registration.95 The Court
noted that such persons, because of their knowledge, would not have to rely
on the protections resulting from registration. 96 The high-wealth-individuals
and families that typically invest in hedge funds must have the requisite
knowledge and access to information that meets the statutory categories of
accredited investors contained in Reg. D of the 1933 Act.97 This allows
hedge funds which offer nonpublic offerings to be exempt from the 1933
Act.
Most hedge funds are able to qualify for an exemption to the 1940
Investment Advisers Act through the use of sections 3(c)(1), 3(c)(7), and
203(b)(3). 98 Hedge funds attempting to circumvent registration under these
exceptions must sell to either no more than 99 accredited investors or no
more than 499 qualified purchasers.99
Exemption 203(b)(3), the private investment adviser exemption, al-
lows an exemption for funds with less than fifteen clients.' 00 A client can be
a person, a limited partnership, or a limited liability company that allows the
fund to invest its money using the hedge fund's investment strategy.' 0' As
long as a hedge fund has less than fifteen limited liability companies or lim-
ited partnerships investing in it, it is exempt from the 1940 Act. After the
203(b)(3) exemption, a hedge fund must only satisfy the net worth require-
ments of exceptions 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) in order to be completely exempt
from registering under the 1940 Act.
10 2
The section 3(c)(1) exemption exempts "any investment vehicle
with no more than 100 beneficial owners that does not make" a public offer-
ing of its securities. 103 Hedge funds are typically structured to qualify for
this exclusion.' 0 4 Section 3(c)(7) exempts any investment company that only
sells to qualified purchasers and does not make any public offerings.'0 5 A
qualified purchaser is any individual or family-owned company with more
than $5 million in investments or certain trusts and any other person that has
at least $25 million in investments. 10 6 Most hedge funds allow only quali-
9' See id
96 Id. at 124-26.
9' See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501.
98 Greupner, supra note 9, at 1587.
99 Id. Qualified purchasers are individuals with a net worth of at least $5 million. Superin-
tendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
100 Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
101 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a) (2005).
102 See Greupner, supra note 9, at 1587.
103 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000); see also Gibson, supra note 93, at 694.
104 Gibson, supra note 93, at 694.
'05 Id. at 695.
106 Id. at 695-96.
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fled purchasers to enter their funds. The exemptions from the 1933 and
1940 Act allowed hedge funds to avoid any required public disclosures or
regulation. Because of these exemptions, U.S. oversight of hedge funds
consisted of anti-fraud statutes and a judicially enforced fiduciary duty to
investors. The hedge fund industry was able to exist, almost regulation free,
within the heavily regulated investment community.
The Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC) also regu-
lates hedge funds. The CFTC regulates transactions in futures and commod-
ity options. 0 7 Investment funds that trade in futures or commodities are
classified as commodity pools that are subject to regulation. 08 The CFTC
defines a commodity pool as "any investment trust, syndicate or similar
form of enterprise operated for the purpose of trading commodity inter-
ests."'10 9 Most hedge funds qualify as a commodity pool." 0 Very few hedge
funds qualify for an exemption from CFTC oversight. The one exemption
that some hedge funds take advantage of is CFTC Rule 4.5. This rule pro-
vides an exemption for commodity pools regulated by other federal or state
law."' Hedge funds that utilize this exemption usually operate offshore.
12
In order to qualify for this exemption, the hedge fund must be domiciled in
a home country that regulates its futures and commodity trading and must
have entered into a satisfactory memorandum of understanding with the
CFTC. "3
CFTC Rule 4.7 grants funds who do not qualify for an exemption,
exemptive relief from full reporting to the CFTC.1 4 Rule 4.7 lists commod-
ity pools that qualify for this exemptive relief"15 Most hedge funds structure
themselves to qualify for this exemptive relief."16 The exemptive relief al-
lows hedge funds to avoid disclosing their positions to investors and prepar-
ing quarterly and annual financial statements. 117
107 Id. at 699.
108 Id.
109 17 C.F.R. § 4.10(d)(1) (2005).
110 Gibson, supra note 93, at 700.
... 17 C.F.R. § 4.5 (2005).
112 Brooksley Born, International Regulatory Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 607, 610-611
(2001).
113 Id. at610-11.
114 Gibson, supra note 93, at 702-03.
... See 17 C.F.R. § 4.7(a)(2); see also Gibson, supra note 93, at 702 (providing an excellent
description of qualifying commodity pools).
116 See Gibson, supra note 93, at 702-03.
117 Id. at702-03.
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C. Proposed New Rule
In its most basic sense, the SEC's new rule cuts out the exemptions
to the 1940 Act that hedge funds had previously enjoyed. The new rule
closes exceptions 3(c)(1), 3(c)(7), and 203(b)(3) to hedge funds. How does
the new rule do this? It closes exceptions 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the 1940
Act to hedge funds by changing the definition of a "private fund" that the
adviser would be required to "look through." ' 1 8 It does this by referencing
within the definition of a "private fund" three characteristics shared by vir-
tually all hedge funds. 19 This requirement forces hedge fund mangers to
"look through" their fund to count U.S. clients.
120
The new rule will also require hedge fund managers to disclose in-
formation about them.' 2' These new disclosures include the fund's history,
personnel experience, past performance, and disciplinary record.' 22 Addi-
tionally, advisers making claims concerning their "track record" must keep
documentation supporting these performance claims.
23
Exception 203(b)(3)-2 is amended to require investment advisers to
count each owner of a "private fund" as a client for purposes of determining
the availability of the private adviser's exemption. 24 Under the previous
rule, hedge funds could create separate limited partnerships, which would
count as one client but serve as conduits for groups of investors.1 25 As long
as a fund had placed its investors in less than fifteen subsidiary funds, the
hedge fund could avoid registration with the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.126 Exception 203(b)(3)-1 is amended to clarify that investment
managers "may not count hedge funds as single clients under that safe
harbor [rule].' 27 Rather than counting entities in their hedge fund,
investment advisers are now required to count each individual investor in
their fund before they can claim the 203(b)(3) exception for having less than
fifteen investors. 1
28
118 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,073 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 72,075.
122 Id.
123 id.
124 Id. at 72,070.
125 Gibson, supra note 93, at 697-98.
126 id.
127 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,075.
128 Id.
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The rule does not alter Rule 203A-1 of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940. If an adviser maintains its principal office in a state with an in-
vestment adviser statute, registration is optional if the adviser has less than
$25 million under management. This provides an exception for small off-
shore funds. 1
29
The new rule contains also alters the exceptions for offshore advis-
ers. When counting clients for the 203(b)(3) exception, an offshore hedge
fund manager now has to look through to the funds she manages, regardless
of where those funds are located, and count investors that are U.S. residents
as clients. 130 An offshore fund with more than fourteen investors who are
U.S. residents would generally have to register under the 1940 Investment
Advisers Act.'3 ' However, "offshore advisers" would generally not be sub-
ject to the substantive provisions of the Act under the new rule. 32 The SEC
staff explains, "[t]he [substantive] laws governing such a fund would likely
be those of the country in which it is organized or those of the country in
which the adviser has its principal place of business.' 33 Essentially, the
SEC reached a compromise position in the new rule's extraterritorial appli-
cation. The new rule requires hedge funds subject to the rule changes to
register with the SEC, but it does not require "offshore advisers" to adhere
to the substantive provisions of the 1940 Investment Advisers Act.
Registration requires "hedge funds to disclose information such as
their trading strategy, the amount of money they manage," and the man-
ager's disciplinary history. 134 Also required under the new regulation is a
description of who its clients are, the educational and business background
of those running the fund, and audited financial statements prepared in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 35 Finally, hedge
funds subject to the new rule will have to adopt a code of ethics and imple-
ment a compliance program.136
129 See Steinwurtzel et al., supra note 17, at 2 n.1.
130 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,071-72.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 72,072.
113 Id. at 72,072 n.213.
134 Kadlec, supra note 24, at 65.
135 Elizabeth M. Schubert, A Compliance Guide to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
HEDGEWORLD.COM, Oct. 20, 2004, http://www.mfainfo.org/images/PDF/HedgeWorld.pdf.
136 Schubert, supra note 135, at 66.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW RULE
A. Problems the New Rule is Designed to Alleviate
The SEC's new rule emanates from the Commission's concern that
the lack of transparency within the hedge fund industry could harm individ-
ual investors and the overall market. 137 The SEC was also concerned about
the risk of systematic loss that hedge funds posed, the effects hedge funds
were having on world financial markets, and the growth in hedge fund
fraud.' 38 The SEC revised the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to alleviate
some of these concerns.
Previously, hedge funds had been exempt from the disclosure re-
quirements of the Investment Advisers Act.1 39 Many hedge funds provided
minimal information about themselves, leaving investors in the dark about
the fund's holdings.140 Investors, unable to evaluate the fund, put their trust
in the manager to continue to generate high returns while assuming minimal
amounts of risk. The SEC did not require hedge funds to provide informa-
tion to its investors, assuming that high-net-worth individuals who invested
in hedge funds were sophisticated enough to determine the risks and re-
wards associated with a given investments.1
4
'
However, as hedge funds became more complex, this assumption
did not always hold true. Many hedge funds invested heavily in over the
counter (OTC) derivative products, which are not regulated. 42 OTC prod-
ucts are complex enough that "even financially sophisticated investors may
lack the expertise" to understand these transactions. 43 This made it even
harder for investors to have the information necessary to make informed,
rational investment decisions about hedge funds.44
Further weakening the SEC's assumption about the knowledge of
wealthy investors is the influx of newly wealthy investors. These individu-
als, whose wealth was created recently, are entertainers, sports stars, and
"dot com" entrepreneurs.14 5 Although wealthy, they tend to lack the requi-
site knowledge to make informed investment decisions. Newly wealthy
137 SEC Staff Report, supra note 90, at 152.
138 Id.
139 Greupner, supra note 9, at 1587.
140 Gregory Zuckerman & Ian McDonald, The Wild West of Hedge Funds Becomes Tamer,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at CI.
141 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
142 Parry, supra note 22, at 706-07.
143 Gibson, supra note 93, at 713.
144 See Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140.
145 Parry, supra note 22, at 719.
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investors are ripe targets for unscrupulous hedge fund advisers. 46 The new
rule the SEC has implemented requires greater disclosure to investors help-
ing to alleviate problems of information asymmetry.
Another concern of the SEC staff is the risk of systematic loss that
hedge funds pose to the world's financial markets. Systemic loss refers to
the risk that a major market participant's losses in the financial markets may
cause widespread loss to other firms in the market, or cause disruptions to
other industries or to the entire worldwide financial system.' 47 The bailout
of LTCM was orchestrated to avoid the possibility of systemic loss in the
world's financial markets.148 Although systemic risk is always a concern in
financial markets, it can be minimized if lenders exercise prudent judgment
in making credit decisions. 149 Prudent judgment by creditors is important
because hedge funds use varying degrees of leverage to amplify their re-
turns. Their leverage typically comes from credit extended to them from
banks. Banks have the responsibility to limit systemic risk by performing
risk analysis before they extend credit and pricing the credit according to
the risk the fund poses.' 50 However, in the case of hedge funds, banks have
difficulty in assessing an accurate interest rate because of the lack of trans-
parency among hedge funds. Banks cannot make accurate risk assessments
without adequate disclosure from hedge funds. When banks are competing
to make loans, they tend to lower their credit standards in an attempt to
make more loans. The disclosure requirements of the new rule will assist
banks in making accurate risk assessments of hedge funds, thereby prevent-
ing the risk of systematic loss.
Also assisting to reduce the risk of systemic loss are large institu-
tional investors. These investors demand more information from hedge
funds about their trading positions and degree of leverage. Previously, it
was common for hedge funds to borrow $10 for every $1 it held. 151 Today,
institutional investors typically do not allow managers to leverage at a ratio
higher than four to one.' 52 Institutional investors are able to have this type of
influence over hedge fund managers because institutional investors contrib-
ute more than half of the hedge funds' assets.
153
146 id.
147 Gibson, supra note 93, at 705.
148 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 84, at xix-xx.
149 See Gibson, supra note 93, at 706-08.
150 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO CONG. REQUESTERS, GAO/GGD-00-3, LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON
SYSTEMATIC RISK 11 (1999), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gaoreports/search.htmil/.
151 Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140.
152 See id.
153 See LHABITANT, supra note 35, at 11.
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Before the new rule, regulators did not have the information neces-
sary to determine the effects hedge funds were having on financial mar-
kets.1 54 Not only did regulators not know the positions held by hedge funds,
but they also did not know the systemic risk that hedge funds were posing to
the markets because many hedge funds borrowed from international banks
not regulated by the United States.155 The disclosure provided by the new
rule allows regulators to determine the position hedge funds have taken;
thereby assisting regulators in determining the risk hedge funds pose to the
markets.
B. Extraterritorial Analysis of Changes to the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940
A key difference between the old and new rule is that the new rule
requires that offshore funds "look through" their clients and determine if the
fund has more than fourteen American investors.156 If the fund has more
than fourteen American investors, the fund must register with the SEC.
57
Offshore funds opposed this rule change claiming that they are already ade-
quately regulated by their home country, and that this regulation does noth-
ing but cause duplicative regulation. 5 8 To minimize the offshore funds'
concern, the SEC exempted publicly offered funds from the new rule and
exempted private offshore funds that are adequately regulated in their home
countries from the substantive provisions of the new rule. 159 However,
hedge funds would still have to go through the expense of looking through
their clients each year and make the mandatory disclosures to the SEC if
they have more than fourteen U.S. investors and its home country's hedge
fund regulations are deemed inadequate by the SEC staff. Hedge funds that
have to register under the new rule can anticipate the cost of compliance to
be around $376,500.160
154 SEC Staff Report, supra note 90, at 152.
155 Barry Eichengreen & Donald Mathieson, Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know?,
Int'l Monetary Fund, 19 ECON. ISSUES 11 (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/extenal
/pubs/ft/issues/issuesl9/index.htm.
156 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,071-72 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279).
157 id.
158 See Letter from Christopher Fawcett, Chairman & Dermont Butler, Deputy Chairman,
Alternative Inv. Mgmt. Ass'n Ltd., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
7 (Sep. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/aima09l504.pdf.
159 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,071-72.
160 The cost of compliance is estimated by the SEC to be $46,000 with an annual increased
workload of 1,469 to be shouldered by the hedge fund's counsel. The cost of counsel is esti-
mated to be $225 an hour. See Letter from Bryan Cave, LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
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The exemption from the substantive provisions of the Investment
Advisers Act for offshore hedge funds has still not resolved the problem of
double registration for many hedge funds. The European Commission,
which administers EU investment regulations, is still concerned that Euro-
pean hedge funds that are subject to stringent regulation in Europe would
have to register with the SEC as well because they have a small, minority
number of U.S. investors. 161 Such double registration increases the cost for
European hedge funds, placing them at a disadvantage compared to Ameri-
can hedge funds that are subject only to SEC oversight. The International
Bar Association (IBA) claims that the application of American securities
law abroad violates the rule of international comity: "[I]n cases where the
U.S. jurisdictional interest is not as great as that of another jurisdiction it
would be appropriate to defer to that foreign jurisdiction to enforce and pro-
tect the rights of its own citizens.' 62 The Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations states that a nation has jurisdiction when part of the conduct takes
place within the territory of that nation or when the conduct affects nation-
als of that nation. 63 Although principles of comity do suggest that the SEC
might be wise to defer to adequate foreign regulators when applicable,
thereby minimizing costs for offshore funds, it is unlikely that a U.S. court
would strike down this regulation as violating international law. The SEC
staff concluded that this proposal was not feasible for the SEC to adopt be-
cause it would require the SEC staff to determine the regulatory require-
ments of hundreds of nations and monitor them on an ongoing basis for
changes in the laws of these nations. 164 The SEC staff claims that such a
rule would unnecessarily tax the resources of the SEC. 165 The SEC prefers
to establish a "single set of rules [that] assures a level playing field for both
U.S. and foreign participants in [U.S.] markets."' 166
To minimize the costs for offshore hedge funds, the International
Bar Association (IBA) has proposed an alternative to counting clients. The
IBA proposes that rather than having a hedge fund manager look through
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 16 (Aug. 16, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/propo
sed/s73004/bryancave081604.pdf.
161 Letter from David Wright to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 6, at 3.
162 Letter from Robert W. Helm, Vice Chair, Int'l Bar Ass'n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 3 (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/propo
sed/s73004/rwhehn091404.pdf.
163 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987); see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
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their fund to determine if they have more or less than fourteen American
investors, the SEC should apply the "significant participation test" from
ERISA law. 167 The "significant participation test" says that a fund manager
should not have to look through its funds "if less than 25% of the value of
any class of equity interests in the private fund is held by 'U.S.
residents."
68
The rationale behind this proposal is that the SEC's requirement
that all offshore hedge funds look through their records to determine if they
have more than fourteen American investors is expensive. The "look
through" process causes funds to incur costs regardless of the number of
American investors they find they have. For large funds with hundreds or
thousands of investors, it can be costly to have to comply with U.S. regula-
tions when the regulation might be triggered by less than 1% of the fund's
shareholders. The other 99% of shareholders, or partners, will have to sus-
tain a substantial increase in costs to comply with a regulation designed to
protect only 1% of shareholders. The 25% of assets rule ensures that regula-
tion will only be pplied when a sizeable percentage of the fund's assets
have been contributed by U.S. residents.
The problem with the IBA proposal is that it does not accomplish
the purposes of the new rule.. The "significant participation test" would
encourage regulatory arbitrage. Onshore funds would be able to move off-
shore and avoid regulation as long as more than 75% of its assets come
from foreign investors. This would prevent the SEC staff from receiving
information from hedge funds to determine the effect they are having on the
financial markets. The IBA proposal would also allow hedge funds to avoid
disclosing more information to their investors. The SEC responded to this
proposal by stating: "[w]e believe that this suggestion would result in most
offshore advisers that serve U.S. investors being exempt from registration,
and we are not adopting it.'
169
C. Extraterritorial Principles Incorporated into the New Rule
The SEC traditionally has justified the extraterritorial application of
American securities law through the effects test of the territoriality principle
and the nationality principle. 170 The effects test of the territoriality principle
167 Letter from Robert W. Helm to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 162, at 2.
168 Id. at 1.
169 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,072.
170 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 cmt. a
(1987); see also Michael D. Mann et al., Oversight by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission of US. Securities Markets and Issues of Internationalization and Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction, 29 INT'L LAW. 731, 731 (1995) (discussing motives for U.S. subject matter
jurisdiction over international securities transactions).
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occurs when a country applies its laws abroad because the activity occurring
abroad has substantial effects within the country's territory. 17' The effects
test has been controversial when applied to conduct that was legal in the
country the conduct occurred in but illegal in the U.S. When the U.S. ex-
tends its jurisdiction in these cases because that conduct had negative eco-
nomic effects within the U.S., the country where the conduct took place
typically objects to the extension of U.S. law to its soil.172 Less controver-
sial is the nationality principle. Under the nationality principle, the U.S.
extends its jurisdiction on the basis that the individuals involved in the ac-
tivity abroad are U.S. residents. 73 The U.S. can extend its jurisdiction to
corporations organized in the U.S. conducting business abroad, by using the
nationality principle.1
74
The SEC's new rule to regulate hedge funds extends extraterritori-
ally by requiring hedge funds located abroad to register with the SEC if they
have more than fourteen American investors. The new rule bases its extra-
territorial application on the nationality principle. The rule applies extrater-
ritorially based on the nationality of those investing in the hedge fund. Once
fifteen U.S. investors invest in the hedge fund, it must register with the
SEC. The new rule also seems to draw slightly from the effects test of the
territorial principle, because the new rule does not become effective based
on nationality until the requisite number of U.S. investors are present. The
arbitrary number of fourteen chosen by the SEC seems based on the theory
that when a certain number of U.S. investors invest in a hedge fund it has an
economic effect on the U.S. Alternatively, the basis for utilizing the stan-
dard of fourteen U.S. investors could be based on the theory that when a
foreign hedge fund accepts money from more than fourteen U.S. investors,
the fund has adopted a distinctively U.S. clientele and thus should comply
with U.S. securities law.
Regardless of whether or not the effects test of the territorial princi-
ple is invoked, one effect of utilizing the nationality principle to apply U.S.
securities law extraterritorially is that this could limit investment and diver-
sification opportunities for U.S. investors. Foreign hedge funds seeking to
avoid the regulatory hassle of SEC registration will likely not allow more
than thirteen U.S. investors to invest in its funds. If many foreign hedge
funds adopt this approach, the number of investment opportunities for
American investors will be limited. However, hedge funds will only avoid
American investors if it is economically viable to do so. If economic forces
"7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 cmt. d
(1987).
172 Id.
173 Id. § 402 cmt. e (1987).
174 Id.
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dictate, foreign hedge funds will not avoid American investors and will
likely register with the SEC.
D. Regulatory Approaches to Hedge Funds Taken by other Nations
The SEC is not the first regulatory authority to regulate hedge
funds. 75 Countries across the globe have taken a variety of approaches to
regulate hedge funds ranging from no regulation at all, to barring hedge
funds entirely. 176 The two most popular places to domicile a hedge fund,
other than the United States, are Europe and the Caribbean.
177
Europe is a popular place for hedge funds because of the relatively
high population of high-net-worth individuals. The laws regulating hedge
funds in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland, France, and Germany
provide a good perspective of the differing approaches taken to hedge fund
regulation in Europe.
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Act of 1986 regu-
lates hedge funds. 7 The Act prohibits fund managers from advising inves-
tors "to enter into investments that are not suitable for them in their circum-
stances."' 79 Clients can choose to contract out of this protection and agree to
be classified as an expert investor if they have a sufficient understanding of
the investment opportunity and have previous experience with the specific
investment. 80 The Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 prohibits
hedge funds, or other unregulated collective investment schemes, from mar-
keting their product to investors, unless the individual is an expert inves-
tor.1 8' The main difference between the U.S. and U.K. definition of a so-
phisticated investor is that the British version of a sophisticated, or expert,
investor pertains to that investor's knowledge and experience, while the
American version refers to the investor's wealth.
Ireland has become a popular domicile for hedge funds in Europe
because of the tax and regulatory advantages of domiciling in Ireland.
8 2
Hedge funds in Ireland are regulated by the Irish Financial Services Regula-
tory Authority (IFSRA). 83 The IFSRA has sped up their regulatory process
to compete with other regulatory authorities, specifically those in the Cay-
175 See generally, BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 57-78 (describing countries that cur-
rently regulate hedge funds).
176 id.
177 See id. at 8.
178 See Parry, supra note 22, at 707.
179 Id.
180 id.
181 Id. at 705 n.8, 708.
182 See O'Leary & McDermott, supra note 18, at 1.
183 Id.
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man Islands that offer quick and non-intrusive regulation of hedge funds. 184
Hedge funds are subject to taxation in Ireland, but at a low rate of 10%. 81
Ireland is also popular among hedge funds because the Irish Stock Ex-
change lists collective investments schemes. These collective investment
schemes are comprised primarily of onshore and offshore hedge funds.
18 6
The Irish Exchange is the leading stock exchange in the world for listing
hedge funds. 187 Popularity of hedge funds in Ireland should only increase
because of proposed changes in the European Union that would allow funds
domiciled in Ireland to be sold throughout the European Union without be-
ing subjected to each member country's regulation. 88 Hedge funds choose
to domicile in Ireland because of the low tax rate, lax regulation, proximity
to London, and access to an exchange.1
89
Switzerland's ability to attract hedge funds is directly related to its
banking industry's ability to attract high-net-worth individuals from around
the world. The banking industry, renowned for its protection of its clients'
privacy, is benefited by lax regulation. The Swiss regulator only requires
that a hedge fund file a prospectus and the regulator regulates the marketing
of the fund.' 90 The minimal regulation required in Switzerland makes Swiss
funds popular to high-net-worth European investors. 19 1 Swiss funds are
taxed, although foreign investors can have the tax rate of 35% rebated to
avoid double taxation by their home country's tax authority. 92 Switzerland
is also a popular place for the sale of offshore funds because Swiss banks
utilize these funds on behalf of their wealthy clients. 193 Hedge funds locate
in Switzerland to be in close proximity to the large number of high-net-
worth individuals who are customers of Swiss banks.
The French hedge fund industry is heavily regulated. Traditionally,
only French banks had access to hedge funds. 194 Essentially, onshore hedge
funds were banned in France because French regulators discouraged the use
of leverage and speculative investments. 195 Offshore funds got around this
regulation by structuring themselves so that they are allowable according to
184 See id.
185 BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 76.
186 See O'Leary & McDermott, supra note 18, at 2.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 3.
189 See id. at 1-3; See also BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 76
190 See BORLA & MASETI, supra note 8, at 6 1.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 62-63.
'9' See id. at 61.
'94 See id. at 65.
195 See LABITANT, supra note 59, at 37.
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regulation. 196 However, these structural changes change the fund so that in
practicality it no longer resembles a hedge fund.197 Offshore funds could not
market their funds in France without prior approval of the French regulatory
authority, the Commission des Operations du Bourse.198 In practice, the
Commission never gave its approval to the marketing of hedge funds, essen-
tially banning offshore funds from France. 199
In 2004, there was a drastic change in France's approach to regulat-
ing hedge funds.200 The Commission des Operations du Bourse merged into
the Autorit6 des march6s financiers ("AMF")20' which has met with French
investment managers to create rules to allow hedge funds to operate more
freely in France.20 z Although the hedge fund industry in France will still be
highly regulated, French authorities have opened up the rules to allow for
the creation of a hedge fund industry in France.20 3
Traditionally, Germany banned the sale of hedge funds.. A tradi-
tional hedge fund cannot be domiciled in Germany because of laws requir-
ing the fund to trade only listed securities, not engage in short selling, and
not employ leverage.2 °4 In the late 1990's, German banks introduced an
innovative type of hedge fund in the form of an index-linked bond.05 These
index-linked bonds are zero-coupon bonds that have their returns linked to
an underlying hedge fund.206 The bonds guarantee the return of the inves-
tor's principal shown in the face value of the bond.20 7 Hedge funds not
domiciled in Germany are heavily regulated in their marketing when they
attempt to solicit German investors.20 8 Essentially, offshore hedge funds can
only be sold in discreet private placements to sophisticated investors.20 9
Germany is an unattractive place to domicile a hedge fund because of ex-
cessive regulation-hedge fund managers are more likely to domicile their
196 See BORLA & MASETrI, supra note 8, at 65.
197 See id.
198 LHABITANT, supra note 59, at 37.
199 Id.
200 See Jerome Souter, The Evolution of the Regulation of Alternative Management in
France, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS MGMT. ASS'N J., Feb. 2005.
201 Id. at 1.
202 See id.
203 See id.; See also Sophia van Straelen, France: A New Market Place for Hedge Funds?,
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS MGMT. Ass'N J., Feb. 2005.
204 LHABITANT, supra note 59, at 34.
205 Id. at 35.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 66.
209 See id. at 66-67.
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hedge fund outside of Germany then sell shares of the fund within Germany
to sophisticated German investors.
The Caribbean is also a popular place for hedge funds to domicile
because of the tax and regulatory advantages of its laws. Most of the islands
in the Caribbean do not tax hedge funds, nor do they heavily regulate hedge
funds. 210 The most popular islands are the Cayman Islands and the British
Virgin Islands. Another popular offshore financial center is Bermuda.
The Cayman Islands is a popular place to domicile hedge funds be-
cause the fund is tax-exempt and encounters little regulation. If the fund is
larger than $50,000 then it does not need to request a license; all it must do
is provide a prospectus and a listing of any public offerings and pay a regis-
tration tax of $875.211 There are over 3,600 hedge funds domiciled in the
Caymans and they manage in excess of $200 billion.212
The British Virgin Islands also require little in the way of regulation
or taxes. The fund must nominate a representative who is based full time in
the British Virgin Islands.213 An annual fee of $350 is required as well.214
Bermuda has more regulation although it does offer the same tax
advantages as its Caribbean competitors. A hedge fund in Bermuda can
structure itself in a variety of ways, but the most popular is the institutional
scheme. The institutional scheme requires each investor to invest a mini-
mum of $100,000 and the assets of the fund must exceed $50,000,000.215
Funds that do not meet these standards are classified as a standard scheme
and are subject to the normal regulation of the Bermuda Monetary Authority
216(BMA). Bermuda is currently considering changes to their law similar to
the new SEC rule that will require more paperwork for Bermuda-based
hedge funds.21 7 Finally, a hedge fund domiciled in Bermuda does not need
to be managed in Bermuda, but certain administrative functions must be
completed in Bermuda.21 8
210 See id. at 75-76.
211 Id. at 75.
212 Mitchell Pacelle & Glenn R. Simpson, Offshore Banking Braces for Disruptions from
Ivan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2004, at B14.
213 BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 75.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 75-6.
217 Glenn R. Simpson & Gregory L. White, Bermuda May Require Hedge Fund Licenses,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2004, at C1.
218 BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 76.
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E. Extraterritorial Effects of the New Rule
Soon after the SEC announced that it was considering a rule change
that would require hedge funds to register with the SEC, the hedge fund
industry reacted by alleging that if the new rule became effective, U.S.
domiciled hedge funds would move offshore to avoid regulation.21 9 The
hedge fund industry also warned that talented hedge fund money managers
would move offshore220 and that American investors would become limited
in their investment choices.221 If these events did occur, they would have a
negative effect on American financial markets and would keep the SEC
from accomplishing the purposes of the new rule.
In order to understand the extraterritorial effects of the rule change,
an understanding of investor motives for investing offshore is required.
Long before the regulation was contemplated, the offshore hedge fund mar-
ket was thriving. Before this regulation was announced, 54% of all hedge
funds were domiciled in the Caribbean, while only 33% of all funds were
domiciled in the United States.222 This number is somewhat misleading be-
cause although the majority of hedge funds are domiciled offshore, most
Caribbean domiciled funds have no trading operations in the Caribbean.
223
Most Caribbean hedge funds are actually partnerships formed by American
hedge funds to provide investment opportunities for their tax-exempt inves-
tors.224 These funds are actively managed in the United States, although
they are domiciled offshore.225 Since these hedge funds are domiciled off-
shore, U.S. regulators do not regulate them; rather, Caribbean regulators
regulate them.
Investors desire offshore investments in the Caribbean for privacy
and tax reasons. 226 Offshore funds are popular among tax-exempt institu-
tions and foreign investors who are exempt from United States income
tax.227 An offshore fund is not designed to help investors avoid taxation,
rather it is designed to assist investors whose assets are already exempt from
taxation in their home countries. 228 Tax-exempt institutions are required to
pay taxes on any investment gains incurred through an investment partner-
ship that uses debt to enhance its returns under Unrelated Business Taxable
219 Sommer, supra note 15.
220 See Steinwurtzel et al., supra note 17.
221 O'Leary & McDermott, supra note 18, at 3.
222 See BORLA & MASETTI, supra note 8, at 8 fig. 1.5.
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Income rules (UBTI).229 Onshore hedge funds are organized as limited part-
nerships and use debt to magnify their returns,230 thus bringing them under
UBTI taxation. This means that tax-exempt institutions would have to pay
taxes on the gains they earn from hedge fund investments. To keep their
tax-exempt status, tax-exempt institutions invest offshore, where hedge
funds are organized as corporations, not partnerships, meaning that the
gains from hedge fund investments do not fall under the UBTI tax rules.
231
A headline in the May 18, 2003, New York Times read, "Bermuda
Isn't Far, Hedge Funds Warn., 232 The headline was the result of public
meetings between hedge fund managers and the SEC discussing the new
rule to regulate hedge funds.233 Hedge fund managers warned that if the
SEC enacted excessive regulation, then hedge funds would simply move
offshore.234 These statements were more than just threats. Hedge funds are a
collection of cash, investments, and human capital-all of which are very
mobile. Hedge funds can change domiciles quickly and cheaply since they
do not own any physical assets. The only asset that a hedge fund would
have to transport would be its human capital. Another concern is that these
rule changes would prompt offshore funds to exclude American investors to
avoid registration under the new rule.
235
A mass exodus of U.S. hedge funds would not bode well for the
U.S. economy or for the effectiveness of the new rule to regulate hedge
funds. If hedge funds relocated offshore, American investors would be at a
comparative disadvantage to their international counterparts. As shown pre-
viously, hedge funds offer advantages to an investment portfolio. Hedge
funds have a low correlation coefficient with equity markets while main-
taining high returns and low risk levels. The low correlation coefficient
makes these vehicles beneficial to investors. Further, if the best hedge fund
managers move offshore, U.S. investors would be forced to invest in the
remaining funds that would not be as well run as offshore funds. The exclu-
sion of American investors from offshore funds would limit diversification
possibilities and investment opportunities for American investors. Investors
would be limited in their diversification options if they no longer had access
to hedge funds.
229 Daniel Shapiro & Christopher Hilditch, Getting the Structure Right, HEDGEFUND
INTELLIGENCE, http://www.hedgefundintelligence.com/ih/reports/2002_12/007.htm (indicat-
ing that gains are taxed only to the extent that they can be attributable to the use of debt).
230 STEFANO LAVINIo, THE HEDGE FUND HANDBOOK 157 (2000).
231 Shapiro & Hilditch, supra note 229.
232 Sommer, supra note 15.
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More importantly, the SEC would not be able to accomplish the
purposes of the new rule. As mentioned previously, the purposes of the new
rule were to provide information to investors, to provide information to the
SEC to assist it in monitoring U.S. financial markets, and to assist the SEC
in preventing the risk of systemic loss in U.S. financial markets.236 If hedge
funds moved offshore, beyond the jurisdictional reach of the SEC, the SEC
would not be able to compile the information it sought by creating the rule.
Further, U.S. investors would not receive the information they need to make
informed investment decisions. If hedge funds do relocate offshore, it would
defeat the purposes of the new rule and harm investors. If hedge funds do
move offshore because of the passing of the new rule then it would have
been better for the SEC not to implement the rule change in order to keep
hedge funds onshore under a minimal level of oversight.
V. CRITICISM OF INDUSTRY THREATS
One of the biggest concerns about the SEC regulating hedge funds
has been that in response, hedge funds would move offshore. The funds
themselves have threatened that they would relocate offshore if the SEC
regulated their industry. 237 Despite their threats, onshore hedge funds will
not relocate offshore. Investors have more power over hedge fund managers
than they have had in the past, which allows investors to demand disclosure
from hedge funds regardless of where the fund is located.238 The SEC also
structured the new rule in a manner that it makes it practically impossible to
move an onshore fund offshore to avoid regulation.239 The fact that many
countries have followed the lead of the SEC and are now planning to regu-
late hedge funds also discourages international arbitrage. 240 The combina-
tion of these market and regulatory roadblocks has created a landscape
where there is little, if any, incentive for an American hedge fund to relocate
offshore to avoid regulation.
236 SEC Staff Report, supra note 90; see also Eichengreen & Mathieson, supra note 155.
237 Sommer, supra note 15.
238 See Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140.
239 The SEC rule makes it difficult for hedge funds to move offshore by requiring all off-
shore hedge funds to register unless they have less than fifteen American investors. See Reg-
istration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054,
72,071-72 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279).
240 See Hedge Fund Issue Too Big To Ignore, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004. See also Simpson
& White, supra note 217.
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A. Increase in Investor Power
Investments from institutional investors have risen since 2000.241
Institutional investors now make up nearly half of the investment in hedge
funds.242 One in five pension funds and many charitable foundations and
university endowments invest in hedge funds.243 These institutions invest,
on average, ten percent of their massive portfolios in hedge funds.244 Institu-
tional investors invest hundreds of millions of dollars in a specific fund
compared to the millions that high-net-worth individuals have invested in
the past.245 The large investments institutional investors make give them
more power over hedge fund managers than high-net-worth individuals
have. An institutional investor comprises a larger percentage of the hedge
fund than one wealthy investor had previously; this consolidated power
gives the institutional investor more power over the hedge fund manager.
With this increased power, institutional investors are demanding
more information from hedge funds. 246 Many institutional investors require
their funds to provide quarterly unaudited reports and annual audited finan-
247cial statements. Institutional investors are also demanding daily and
weekly changes in net asset values, elaborate measurements of the firm's
risk, and details about the hedge fund's back-office operations.248 Some
institutional investors have gone as far as asking for the hedge fund's actual
positions and industry and sector exposure. 249 These demands are not lim-
ited to institutional investors. Many wealthy individual investors are now
requiring more information about the performance and risk of the hedge
funds.2 0 The disclosures hedge funds are making to their investors far ex-
ceed the mandatory disclosures the SEC is requiring in its new rule to regu-
late hedge funds.251 Market forces are demanding more information than
regulators are asking for.
241 See Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140. See also LHABITANT, supra note 35, at
11.
242 LHABITANT, supra note 35, at 11 (indicating that both institutional investors and finan-
cial institutions are included as institutional investors).
243 Frank Partnoy, Road Rules for Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at A33.
244 Id.





250 Robert Frank, More Fret over Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2005, at C1.
251 Compare Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140 (reporting that many hedge funds
respond to customer concerns by providing weekly, and sometimes daily, values of net as-
sets), with Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
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These market forces do not always force hedge fund managers to
disclose more information. For instance, when Goldman Sachs' star trader,
Eric Mindich, formed his own hedge fund in the spring of 2004, he provided
investors essentially with no information about his hedge fund, yet investors
still fought to join his hedge fund.252 In fact, Mr. Mindich had to turn away
investors because he had already received such a large amount of money in
his fund.253 It is questionable whether this exuberance in Mr. Mindich's
hedge fund is rational. Although Mr. Mindich is likely a very capable fund
manager, investors cannot make an informed investment decision without
having any substantive information about the hedge fund. It appears inves-
tors are speculating and exhibiting the type of behavior consistent with a
"bubble" being present in the market.25 4 Although market forces do not al-
ways demand increased disclosure from every hedge fund, almost all hedge
funds are disclosing more information to investors.
B. Decrease in the Power of Hedge Fund Managers
As investor power has increased, the power of hedge fund managers
has decreased because of increased competition. Hedge funds are able to
generate large returns by taking advantage of market inefficiencies.255 As
more funds enter the marketplace, the market becomes more efficient mak-
ing it difficult for hedge funds to generate the large returns that made them
famous. Record amounts of money have flowed into the hedge fund indus-
try recentl y2 56, bringing with it thousands of new funds.257 In the fourth
quarter of 2004 alone, investors invested $27 billion in hedge funds. 58 With
this new investment has come a proliferation of new funds that often crowd
out incumbents, making it difficult to generate large returns.259 So much
money has flowed into merger-stocks, stocks for short selling, and converti-
Reg. 72,054, 72,077 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279) (describing
SEC requirement for quarterly audits).
252 Gregory Zuckerman & Henry Sender, Ex- Trader Creates Hot Hedge Fund And a Traf-
fic Jam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at Al.
253 Id.
254 For an excellent description of bubble behavior, see generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A
RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 34-51 (8th ed. 2003) (describing incidents of bubble
behavior including the Dutch tulip bulb craze of the seventeenth century, the British South
Sea Bubble of the eighteenth century, and the Wall Street bubble of the 1920's).
255 See Greupner, supra note 9, at 1560.
256 See Wright, supra note 77.
257 See Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140 (describing $600 billion increase in the
size of the hedge fund market over four years and the diverse market of over 8000 hedge
funds pursuing a variety of investment objectives).
258 Wright, supra note 77.
259 Zuckerman & Sender, supra note 252.
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ble bonds that there are not many opportunities for high returns in these
categories any more. 260 As returns diminish in the hedge fund industry, in-
vestors will demand concessions from fund managers or they will move
their money elsewhere. 26' To placate investors, managers will inevitably
disclose more information about their funds.262 Some hedge fund managers
will likely begin to deviate from their stated investment strategies and pur-
sue new strategies in search of larger returns.263 Already, desperate hedge
fund managers are turning to riskier strategies, such as long only funds, to
generate the large returns that they are famous for generating.26
In the current competitive state of the hedge fund industry, hedge
fund managers will not be able to relocate their funds offshore unless their
investors want them to do so. Although, managers want to relocate offshore
to avoid upcoming SEC disclosures, investors are demanding that hedge
fund managers make disclosures in excess of what the SEC is requiring,
thus defeating the managers' purpose in moving offshore.
C. Regulatory Roadblocks to Arbitrage
In addition to the market conditions that prevent hedge funds from
moving offshore, there are regulatory roadblocks that prevent hedge funds
from moving offshore to avoid this regulation. One of the main roadblocks
is the SEC's new rule change. The new rule serves as a roadblock because a
hedge fund manager can avoid regulation only if he or she has less than
fifteen American clients.265 The majority of onshore funds are comprised
predominately of American investors. If the fund manager wants to move
the fund offshore, the manager must find a new group of foreign investors
with enough money to invest to replace the hedge fund's American inves-
tors. This is difficult to do in practice because of increased competition in
the hedge fund industry. This provision of the rule change makes it difficult
for hedge funds to employ regulatory arbitrage.
Anther regulatory roadblock to fund managers is the adoption of the
new SEC rule by other foreign regulatory agencies. Many European coun-
tries already regulate hedge funds more strictly than the United States.266
Other European countries, like the United Kingdom, are currently evaluat-
ing the American rule and considering changes to their own oversight of
260 Zuckerman, supra note 44.
261 See Frank, supra note 250.
262 Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140.
263 See Frank, supra note 250.
264 Zuckerman, supra note 44.
265 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,071-72 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279).
266 See BORLA & MASETrI, supra note 8, at 60-78.
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hedge funds.2 67 Some offshore financial centers have taken notice of the
new regulation. For instance, Bermuda is considering making a change in its
law to regulate hedge funds.268 The increased scrutiny from regulators
across the globe only compounds the difficulty hedge fund managers would
have trying to relocate their hedge funds offshore.
D. Evidence
To date, there has been no evidence that hedge fund managers are
moving their onshore funds offshore in response to this regulation. In fact,
early evidence shows that hedge funds are staying in the United States and
disclosing more information about their trading strategies and positions to
investors. 269 Time will tell whether hedge funds carry out on their promises
to move offshore. The evidence today appears to show that investors are
investing offshore not to avoid regulation, but rather to take advantage of
the tax incentives offshore.
An evaluation of market forces and the regulatory environment
shows that hedge funds will not move offshore in response to the new rule
because the market and regulatory climate will not allow it. In fact, market
forces have solved the information asymmetry problem themselves. Market
forces have forced hedge fund managers to disclose more information about
their hedge funds to investors, helping investors to get the necessary infor-
mation they need to make rational, informed investment decisions. The
SEC's new rule does not assist in solving the information asymmetry prob-
lem with investors because market forces are forcing hedge funds to dis-
close information to investors without the SEC's new rule. The main prob-
lem that the SEC's new rule solves is the problem the SEC had in obtaining
information from hedge funds. The disclosure requirements of the new rule
will allow the SEC staff to determine the systematic risk that hedge funds
pose on our financial markets. The new rule will also ensure the efficacy of
the information that hedge funds disclose to their investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hedge funds are currently the darlings of the investment community
because of their reclusive nature and tantalizing returns. Hedge funds con-
gregate to Greenwich, Connecticut and other glamorous suburbs outside of
267 Press Release, FSA Launches Debate on the Impact of Hedge Funds in the UK (June
23, 2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/ 068.s
html.
268 Simpson & White, supra note 217.
269 Zuckerman & McDonald, supra note 140.
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New York, San Diego, Boston, and San Francisco.270 The best and the
brightest of Wall Street are packing up their bags and leaving Manhattan to
start their own hedge funds.271 And who can blame them? Sixteen hedge
fund managers in 2003 made more than $100 million, with George Soros
leading the way making $750 million in 2003.272 Hedge funds were flying
under the radar of regulators, allowing hedge fund managers to operate their
funds without any interference from bureaucrats in Washington, D.C. On
July 10, 2004, the SEC announced that it was proposing a rule that would
bring hedge funds under the watchful eye of SEC regulators in Washington,
D.C.
Not surprisingly, hedge fund managers resisted the rule and hired an
army of lawyers and lobbyists to quash the proposal. The SEC was flooded
with comment letters from law firms and industry groups that opposed the
new rule.273 Lobbyists spoke to members of Congress who joined in the
fight against the new rule. Hedge fund managers threatened to pack their
bags and leave the U.S. for tropical destinations in the Caribbean. Then in
December of 2004, the SEC approved the rule and nothing happened.
Hedge fund managers had their teams of lawyers draw up compliance plans
as hedge fund managers went back to work in their comfortable offices in
Greenwich.
The reason why hedge fund managers will not move offshore is be-
cause it is not feasible. Market conditions, foreign regulators, and provisions
of the new rule make it impractical for hedge funds to move offshore. In
response to the SEC's rule change, regulators across the world have made
changes to their securities laws to bring hedge funds under their regulatory
jurisdictions. Thus, moving offshore will not always exempt hedge funds
from regulation.
The SEC designed its new rule to make it difficult for hedge funds
to move offshore. Hedge funds can only be exempt from the new rule if
they are comprised of less than fifteen American investors. Most onshore
hedge funds have hundreds, if not thousands, of American investors, mak-
ing it practically impossible for hedge funds to move offshore. Finally, and
most importantly, hedge funds would receive no benefit from moving off-
shore because of market pressures. Increased competition within the hedge
fund industry has reduced the power of hedge fund managers while increas-
ing the power of investors. Hedge fund managers can no longer withhold
270 The New Money Men, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://www.economist.co
m/fmance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3666459.
271 Zuckerman & Sender, supra note 252.
272 The New Money Men, supra note 271.
273 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,058 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pts. 275, 279).
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pertinent information about their funds from investors. In fact, many inves-
tors are demanding more information than the SEC is requiring. If hedge
fund managers are forced by their investors to divulge information about the
fund, there is little incentive for hedge fund managers to avoid regulation by
moving off shore.
The information that hedge funds provide about themselves will in-
sure the free flow of accurate information to hedge fund investors and regu-
lators alike. Although the new rule will not cause an influx in offshore
hedge funds, it will have other extraterritorial effects. It is likely that indi-
vidual American investors will be excluded from small to mid-size offshore
funds that do not want to comply with American securities law. Further
research could evaluate how these limited investment opportunities affect
American investors. Other areas of inquiry are needed to evaluate how for-
eign regulators react to the SEC's new rule and to what extent they follow
the lead of U.S. regulators.
Hedge funds have a beneficial impact on U.S. financial markets by
making the markets more efficient. Hedge funds help to ensure that prices in
the U.S. financial markets are accurate. However, for all the good hedge
funds do, their fraudulent use can severely weaken U.S. financial markets.
When the SEC was contemplating a new rule to regulate hedge funds, it had
to be careful to not only discourage the destructive potential of hedge funds
but also to promote the positive behavior of hedge funds. The SEC walked
this line masterfully in creating the latest rule to regulate hedge funds. The
new rule promotes the free sharing of information that makes markets more
efficient, while at the same time discouraging fraudulent or inaccurate re-
porting of information. The new rule is not overbearing either. Despite
hedge fund managers' threats, the new rule will not force hedge funds off-
shore; rather, the new rule has facilitated greater oversight of hedge funds
abroad thereby securing world financial markets. The SEC's new rule helps
investors and regulators receive the information they need to make in-
formed, rational decisions. Informed investors and regulators will in turn
make our financial markets stronger.
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